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Antitrust and Foreign Commerce: Reach and Grasp
by John R. Lacey*
In recent years world trade has grown almost exponentially. Mul-
tinational corporations, of almost every size and nationality, have grown
along with it.' As more and more business transactions cross interna-
tional boundaries, the reach and grasp of United States antitrust law has
become a topic of critical concern to both businessmen and lawyers
across the globe. 2 Whether an international dealing involves exports, im-
ports, licensing, joint venture, merger, or overseas establishment, the far-
reaching, nearly all-pervasive presence of antitrust considerations must
be taken into account. These may often determine not only the opera-
tion, but the very character, of transactions.
A highly-charged subject in the purely domestic context, 3 with ques-
tions constantly raised as to its very purpose, antitrust law becomes even
more controversial when it reaches across international borders, seeks to
control activities of non-nationals, and occasionally impinges on foreign
sovereigns. Moreover, the clash of competing values, perhaps inevitable
in an interdependent world, becomes more intense as foreign competi-
tion policies such as that of the European Economic Community mature,
as foreign governments participate more actively in commercial matters,
and as the western trading nations deal more frequently with the entirely
different system of the socialist countries. 4
It would be impossible to do more than merely outline the broad
* Georgetown University, School of Foreign Service, B.S.F.S. 1967; University of Vir-
ginia, School of Law, J.D. 1971; Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy, M.A. 1975, M.A.L.D.
1976. Currently, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Unit, State of Connecticut. The views
expressed herein are solely those of the author and are not intended to reflect any official posi-
tion of any officer or agency of the State of Connecticut.
I See generally C. KINDLEBERGER, AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD (1969); R. VERNON,
SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY: THE MULTINATIONAL SPREAD OF U.S. ENTERPRISE (1971); C.F. BERG-
STEN, T. HORST & T. MORAN, AMERICAN MULTINATIONALS AND AMERICAN INTERESTS
(1978). For a critical view, see R. BARNET & R. MULLER, GLOBAL REACH (1974).
2 See generally K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD (1958); W.
FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS (1973); E. KINTNER & M. JOEL-
SON, AN INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST PRIMER (1974) (hereinafter referred to as ANTITRUST
PRIMER).
3 Compare R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX (1978); R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW
(1976); C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY (2d ed. 1965).
4 See generally H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS (2d ed.
1976); E. STEIN, E.P. HAY & M. WAELBROECK, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW AND INSTITU-
TIONS IN PERSPECTIVE (1976).
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scope of U.S. antitrust in this brief space. Accordingly, this limited dis-
cussion will attempt only to highlight the major statutes, cases, governing
doctrine, and abundant commentary. It will also focus on a few of the
problem areas and topics of recent interest with a view toward identify-
ing some general trends in the law as well as pointing out some of the
more prominant pitfalls. Unfortunately, due to the difficult, costly, and
highly debatable nature of this subject, more questions will likely be
raised than answered.
I.
The United States antitrust laws represent the expression of a fun-
damental legislative policy decision founded in the notion of protecting
competition in a free and open marketplace. 5 Justice Black set forth
what is perhaps the classic statement of this policy: "The Sherman Act
was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at
preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade."'6
As a basic component of national economic policy, the antitrust
laws touch virtually all business activity and have been held to extend to
the full reach of Congress' power to regulate commerce. 7 The private
action for injunction and/or treble damages has long been recognized as
the primary vehicle for enforcing the antitrust laws and for promoting
the competitive conditions they are designed to protect.8 It should also
be emphasized, however, that government enforcement may be either
civil or criminal in nature, and the latter may involve felony conviction
accompanied by heavy fines and imprisonment. 9
Another critical consideration derives from the general, broad-brush
language of the statutes. This results in a notable lack of certainty and
predictability while conferring on courts and judges almost unlimited
discretion.' 0 Some activities, such as price fixing, tie-ins, market alloca-
tions, and group boycotts have come to be characterized as per se illegal,
requiring no further inquiry into their nature or anticompetitive im-
pact."I Other activities are judged by application of a rule of reason
5 For a general discussion of antitrust statutes and cases, see L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOXK OF
THE LAW OF ANTITRUST (1977); P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS (2d ed. 1974); A. NEALE,
THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE U.S.A. (2d ed. 1976).
6 Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958). See also Apex Hosiery Co. v.
Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 502-504 (1940) (effect on competition is the sine qua non of antitrust liabil-
ity); Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359 (1933).
7 See Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738 (1976). Accord, Goldfarb
v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
8 See, e.g., NBO Indus. Treadway Cos. v. Brunswick Corp., 523 F.2d 262 (3d Cir. 1975).
9 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1970).
10 In Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803), Justice Marshall observed:
"It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." A
recent antitrust case noted, "In the antitrust field the courts have been accorded, by common
consent, an authority they have in no other branch of enacted law." United States v. United
Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 348 (D. Mass. 1953).
1 1 Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958). The court went on to describe
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analysis necessitating extensive inquiry into the relevant market, various
economic factors, and the overall effects of the restraints. 12 Whatever the
ultimate characterization of the conduct, it is settled doctrine that the
policy encouraging antitrust enforcement is also designed to discourage a
court from dismissing an action where any colorable claim can be made
out. '
3
One of the most frequently litigated and controversial aspects of the
antitrust statutes is their extraterritorial application. 14 The pertinent
statutes are all intended to reach foreign commerce, at least insofar as it
affects United States trade. For example, the Sherman Act states:
"Every contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States, or wi'thforetgn nations, is declared to
be illegal" (emphasis added).' 5
Similar provisions are found in the Federal Trade Commission Act,
which is directed at unfair methods of competition and has been held to
reach even incipient anticomp.etitive conduct.' 6 Likewise, express provi-
sions of the Clayton Act, governing mergers, acquisitions, and certain
discriminatory pricing practices apply to both domestic and foreign com-
merce.' 7 Imports are specifically covered by the terms of the Wilson
Tariff Act 18 and the Tariff Act of 1930.19
such illegal conduct, stating, "[T]here are certain agreements or practices which because of their
pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to
be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have
caused or the business excuse for their use." Id. at 5. See generally W. FUGATE, supra note 2, at
174; L. SULLIVAN, supra note 5, at 165.
12 Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). The rule of reason
was recently substantially extended by Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S.
36 (1977), overruling in part, United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967). For
analysis of Sylvania, see Pitofsky, The Sylvania Case: Antitrust Analysis of Non-Price Vertical Restric-
tions, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1978); Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach. Reflecttns
on the Sylvania Deci ion, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1977).
13 Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 360 U.S. 464 (1962); Mandeville Island Farms,
Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948). In United States v. American To-
bacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 181 (1911), the Court stated, "[The Sherman Act] ... embraced every
conceivable act which could possibly come within the spirit or purpose of the prohibitions of the
law, without regard to the garb in which such acts were clothed."
14 See ABA, ANTITRUST LAw DEVELOPMENT 354 (1975) [hereinafter cited as ANTITRUST
DEVELOPMENTS]; Jennings, ExtraterritorialjursdWtion and the Unted States Antitrust Laws, 33 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 146 (1957); Kintner & Griffin,Jurisdiction Over Foreign Commerce Under the Sherman
Antitrust Act, 18 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 199 (1977).
15 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
16 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970). The FTC Act is somewhat broader than the Sherman Act in
that it is addressed to unfair trade practices and "Congress intentionally left development of the
term 'unfair' to the Commission." Atlantic Refining Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357, 367 (1965).
Generally, the FTC's jurisdiction is considered concurrent where the challenged acts are also
covered by other statutes. See FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683 (1948). See also FTC v. Sperry
& Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 239 (1972) (preferred public policy and values in § 5 of the
FTC Act go beyond the letter of the antitrust statutes). For an example of extraterritorial
application, see Branch v. FTC, 141 F.2d 31 (7th Cir. 1944).
17 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-14, 19-21, 22-27, 44 (1970). See also Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 13 (1970) (price discrimination amendments to the Clayton Act).
18 15 U.S.C. §§ 8-9 (1970). For analysis, see W. FUGATE, supra note 2, at 393. See also
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It should also be noted that these statutes are paralleled by liberal
jurisdictional provisions governing venue, service of process, and overall
amenability to suit.20 Moreover, the case law has applied all of these
quite broadly. For example, a Swiss corporation which merely granted a
license to a U.S. company has been found reachable,2' as has an Italian
automobile manufacturer with dealers located in New York. 22 In short,
these statutes, together with the cases applying them, are capable of
reaching a very wide spectrum of actors and activities both here and
abroad.
23
Ironically, the first case to deal directly with extraterritorial applica-
tion of the antitrust laws, American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co. ,24 held
there was no jurisdiction since the various challenged acts were per-
formed wholly abroad. Since that time, however, the tables have turned.
As of 1973, the Department of Justice had filed approximately 248 cases
dealing with foreign trade and had never lost on jurisdictional grounds. 25
In United States v. American Tobacco Co. ,26 for example, the Supreme Court
struck down a cartel agreement providing for a division of territories and
found sufficient jurisdiction over British co-conspirators.
American Banana was first specifically distinguished in United States v.
Sisal Sales Corp. ,27 in which the Supreme Court held illegal an attempt to
monopolize the sisal trade partially effectuated by defendants' obtaining
favorable legislation from the Mexican government. The Court's reason-
ing is important to an understanding of the direction future cases would
take: "Here we have a contract, combination and conspiracy entered
Fosburgh v. California & Hawaiian Sugar Refining Co., 291 F. 29 (9th Cir. 1923); Adams-
Mitchell Co. v. Cambridge Distributing Co., Ltd., 189 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1951).
19 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1970). See generally LaRue, Section 337 of the 1930 Tarf Act and Its
Section 5 FTC Act Counterpart, 43 ANTITRUST L.J. 608 (1974). For a summary of the statutes, see
ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 14, at 354 n.2.
20 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 22 (1970) (may sue in any district where found); 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391(d) (1968) (alien may be sued in any district); United States v. Scophony Corp. of
America, 333 U.S. 795 (1948) (may reach foreign parent by jurisdiction over subsidiary located
in U.S.). For discussion, see W. FUGATE, supra note 2, at 89; ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS, supra
note 14, at 360. See generalo,, Victor & Hood, PersonaljuridWtn, Venue, and Service of Process in
Antitrust Cases Involving International Trade. Amenability of Alien Corporations to Suit, 46 ANTITRUST
LU. 1063 (1978).
21 Japan Gas Lighter Ass'n v. Ronson Corp., 257 F. Supp. 219 (D.N.J. 1966).
22 Hoffman Motors Corp. v. Alfa Romeo, S.p.A., 244 F. Supp. 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
23 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS
(1977). See also Memorandum of the Department fjusttce Concerning Antitrust and Foreign Commerce,
[19721 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 50,129.
24 213 U.S. 347 (1909). See generally Kintner & Hollgarten, Application of United States Anti-
trust Laws to Foreign Trade and Commerce- Variations on American Banana since 1909, 15 B.C. INDUS.
& COM. L. REv. 343 (1973). The alternative act of state holding in American Banana is discussed
at note 101 infla and accompanying text.
25 See W. FUGATE, supra note 2, at 498. See also Rahl, Foreign Commerce jurisdiction ofthe
Amernian Antitrust Laws, 43 ANTITRUST L.J. 521 (1974).
26 221 U.S. 106 (1911). Accord, United States v. Pacific & Arctic Ry. & Navigation Co.,
228 U.S. 87 (1913) (division of shipping routes voided); Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66 (1917)
(existence of conspirators in U.S. supports jurisdiction over division of trade routes).
27 274 U.S. 268 (1927).
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into by parties within the United States and made effective by acts done
therein. The fundamental object was control of both importation and
sale of sisal and complete monopoly of both internal and external trade
therein."'2 8 Sisal thus represents a major move in the direction of extra-
territoriality; much of the challenged activity not only took place abroad
but was assisted by favorable foreign government intervention.
While earlier cases such as Sisal fairly consistently expanded the
reach of the antitrust laws, it was not until the 1945 decision of United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa) 29 that the so-called effects doc-
trine, which forms the heart of present-day extraterritoriality theory, was
fully articulated. The litigation involved no U.S. company directly, but
rather a Swiss subsidiary created by aluminum cartel members to man-
age and maintain their world-wide monopoly. Judge Hand stated:
We should not impute to Congress an intent to punish all whom its
courts can catch, for conduct which has no consequences within the
United States. (citations omitted) On the other hand, it is settled law
• . .that any state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within
its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders which has consequences
within its borders which the state reprehends. . .The agreements were
unlawful, though made abroad, if they were intended to affect imports
and did affect them.
3 0
Departing from earlier cases, Alcoa shifted the focus of the inquiry
from who was involved and where the activity took place to an examina-
tion of the challenged conduct in terms of its effects on U.S. commerce
and whether such effects were both direct and intended. 3 1 While there
has been much controversy over the detailed application of the doctrine,
particularly with regard to the quantum of required effect and the no-
tions of foreseeability and intention, 32 the essential theory has become
part and parcel of antitrust and so widely accepted in the case law as to
28 Id. at 276. See also United States v. Baush & Lomb Optical Co., 34 F. Supp. 267
(S.D.N.Y. 1940) (upholding indictment charging a division of world markets with German com-
petitor).
29 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
30 Id. at 443-44. See Kintner & Griffin, supra note 14, at 210; Rahl, supra note 25, at 521.
The lower court in Alcoa had required a finding of a "direct and material" effect. 44 F. Supp.
97, 283 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
31 See American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1908); Rahl, supra note 25,
at 523. See also Victor, Multinational Corporations. Antitrust Extraterrtoriahy and the Prospect of lmmu-
nity, 8 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 11 (1973). Cf Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Distillers Co., Ltd.,
395 F. Supp. 221 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (intent may also be inferred from the conduct of the parties).
32 Substantial authority supports the effects doctrine in international law. See, e.g., The
S.S. Lotus, [1927] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10. See generally Kintner & Griffin, supra note 14; Rahl,
supra note 25. Compare Jennings, supra note 14, at 175 (endorsing extraterritorial antitrust juris-
diction based on effects so long as they are not "mere repercussions") with Haight, International
Law and the Extraterritorial Application of the Antitrust Laws, 63 YALE L.J. 639 (1954). The court
criticized the effects doctrine as a "basic misconception regarding the international law compe-
tence of the United States." Id. at 642.
Whatever the measure, the effects doctrine is closely analogous to, and probably substan-
tially justified by, the fundamental antitrust doctrines regarding standing. For example, in
Long Island Lighting Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 521 F.2d 1269 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. aenied, 423
U.S. 1073 (1976), the court described the target area test, requiring a plaintiff to show it was
aimed at and actually hit: "[P]arties whose injuries may be both immediate and foreseeable
6 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
be specifically adopted in the Restatement, albeit with slight modifica-
tion.3 3
To fully understand the effects doctrine and its development by the
judiciary, it is important to bear in mind that its assertion almost inevita-
bly raises serious questions of enforcement jurisdiction over non-nationals
and, consequently, sensitive issues of international comity.3 4  These
problems have long confounded courts and commentators here and
abroad. In general, authorities such as the Restatement suggest that ex-
traterritorial enforcement requires consideration of such factors as the
national interests of each state involved and the amount of hardship in-
consistent enforcement would impose.35 Courts must inquire into the na-
ture and location of the offense, the relation of the perpetrators and the
offense to the United States, and the nature of the remedy sought. 36 It is
important to note, however, that these are essentially issues limited to
damages and remedies rather than to liability and the underlying subject
matter jurisdiction.
The clash of such competing considerations is illustrated in United
States v. Imperial Chemical Industri'es, Ltd. (IC.l ),36a in which the court
found that, "... the law is crystal clear: a conspiracy to divide territo-
ries, which affects American commerce, violates the Sherman Act."' 37
The court then enjoined the defendant, a British company, from exercis-
ing certain rights in British patents assigned to it by the DuPont Com-
pany. I.C.I. was later successfully sued in a British court for specific
may lack standing to pursue a private remedy if that injury is indirect or incidental, or if their
business was not in the target area." Id. at 1274.
To recover, then, a plaintiff must show not only a violation but antitrust injury of the type
the antitrust laws were intended to prevent. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.,
395 U.S. 100, 125 (1969). Compare Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477
(1977) (showing of only tendency to lessen competition; Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18) with
Engine Specialties, Inc. v. Bombardier Ltd., [1979-2] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 62,770 (1st
Cir. 1979) (showing of actual harm; Sherman Act §§ 1, 2, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2). Once antitrust
injury is established, it remains to show causation, although the amount of damages may, under
the Clayton Act, be established by reasonable inference. See Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson
Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555 (1931).
33 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 18
(1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT]. Section 18 requires that, regarding extraterritorial
jurisdiction over aliens, a court must find a "constituent element" of the offense to have oc-
curred in the United States. But cf. Metzger, The Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law ofthe
United States. Bases and Confhcts ofJurnsdtction, 41 N.Y.U.L. REV. 7 (1966) (§ 18 too restrictive).
34 The underlying issue was summarized by Myers McDougal:
In an interdependent world interference by States in each other's community
processes, including economic affairs, is inescapable. The question is by what
principles and procedures such interference can be moderated and made recipro-
cally tolerable in the maintenance and expansion of an international economy.
INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE FIFTY-FIRST CONFERENCE 304, 331
(1965).
35 RESTATEMENT, supra note 33, § 40 and accompanying Notes and Comments.
36 See generaly Note, Extraterrtonal Application ofthe Antitrust Laws, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1452
(1956).
36a 1.00 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
37 Id. at 592.
INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST OVERVIEW
performance by its British sub-licensee. 38 In that decision, the court took
an understandably dim view of the American decree which had been so
framed as to require compliance in Britain by British nationals.
39
While subsequent cases have generally produced decrees framed in
deference to comity considerations, 40 the extraterritorial reach of the an-
titrust laws has grown apace and has been applied to an increasingly
broader range of activities and actors. Overall, the basic antitrust theo-
ries encouraging competition apply in the same fashion to international
transactions as to solely domestic ones. For example, the IC.1 litigation
was concerned with a joint venture that was found to result in a division
of territories and a lessening of competition between partners who indi-
vidually possessed substantial market power.
4 1
In United States v. Ciba Corp. ,42 the merger of two Swiss firms was
challenged since it would have resulted in consolidation of their respec-
tive U.S. subsidiaries and a consequent lessening of competition in the
U.S. market. Fortuitously, the Department of Justice had unquestioned
jurisdiction over the subsidiaries and, as a result, was able to negotiate a
consent decree providing for a spin-off of certain products without block-
ing the underlying merger or causing undue international friction.
43
Similarly, the purchase by Schlitz of a Canadian brewer was prevented
under the Clayton Act on the grounds that it would reduce merely po-
tential competition.
44
International cartels and cartel-like arrangements that restrict access
to markets and otherwise limit competition are particular targets of anti-
38 British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., [1952] 2 All E.R.
780.
39 Id. at 782. In its decree, the U.S. court allowed for such an eventuality, but without
conceding the issue. United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., 105 F. Supp. 215
(S.D.N.Y. 1951) (final order). See also United States v. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, [1969]
Trade Cases (CCH) 72,742 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (consent decree exempting certain foreign activ-
ity).
40 See, e.g., United States v. Holophane Co., 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (per curtam) (defendant
required to use reasonable efforts to market, but no requirement to violate any foreign patent or
trademark rights).
41 See also United States v. General Dyestuff Corp., 57 F. Supp. 642 (S.D.N.Y. 1944);
United States v. Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co., 92 F. Supp. 947 (D. Mass. 1950);
text accompanying note 74 infa. In Engine Specialties, Inc. v. Bombardier Ltd., [1979-2]
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 62,770 (1st Cir. 1979), the court found a per se violation and ob-
served that "[tihe talisman of 'joint venture' cannot save an agreement otherwise inherently
illegal." Id. at 78,416. Accord, United States v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 371 U.S. 296
(1963) (restraint of potential competition through joint venture constitutes violation of Sherman
Act § 2). See generally Pitofsky,oint Ventures Under the Antitrust Laws: Some Reflections on the Sgn ii-
cance of Penn-Ohin, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1007 (1969).
42 [1970] Trade Cases (CCH) 73,269 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (consent decree).
43 Id See also United States v. Standard Oil Co., [1970] Trade Cases (CCH) 72,988
(N.D. Ohio 1970) (consent decree allowing purchase but requiring partial divestiture to main-
tain competition).
44 United States v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 253 F. Supp. 129 (N.D. Cal. 1966), afd,
385 U.S. 37 (1966), (per curiam), rehearing denied, 385 U.S. 1021 (1967). See general DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, MERGER GUIDELINES, reprinted in ANTITRUST PRIMER (App. III), supra note 2, at 351.
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trust attack.45 In Untied States v. National Lead Co. ,46 the court struck
down such an arrangement between domestic and foreign titanium pro-
ducers as a per se violation of the Sherman Act. Interestingly, the court
did so in spite of a showing that the arrangement had actually produced
efficiencies, a rise in output, and a price decline. 4 7 The important deci-
sion in United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co. 48 voided an allocation of
markets between commonly-owned companies despite a defense that the
challenged agreements were merely ancillary to an otherwise legal joint
venture. The case is also important for its treatment of intra-corporate
conspiracy, allowing the antitrust laws to reach conduct by an offshore
parent or subsidiary as long as its counterpart is located here. 49
In United States v. General Electric Co. 50 an agreement made abroad
and specifically tailored to avoid U.S. antitrust laws by excluding the
American market was struck down as having an adverse effect on compe-
tition by impinging on both import and export activities. While the final
decree was framed to minimize conflict with foreign law, the significance
of the case really lies in the court's refusal to narrow the effects doctrine
where the parties had clearly intended not to affect U.S. commerce.
In a similar vein, but involving only U.S. nationals, is Steele v. Bulova
Watch Co. 51 The court, relying on what it saw as unlawful effects on
United States commerce, sustained a charge of infringement of plaintiff's
trademark on watches assembled and marketed almost wholly in Mex-
ico. 52 In United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc. 5
45 See generally C. EDWARDS, THE CONTROL OF CARTELS AND MONOPOLIES (1967).
46 63 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), aj'd, 332 U.S. 319 (1947). Accord, In re SKF Indus-
tries, Inc., F.T.C. Dkt. No. 9046, reprinted in ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (no. 925) at F- I
(Aug. 2, 1979) (allocation of product market as per se violation).
47 332 U.S. at 346-47. For a discussion of the tension in antitrust between efficiency-creat-
ing restraints and the policy of competition preservation, see R. BORK, supra note 3, at 277-79.
Sullivan distinguishes the beneficial effects of cooperatives, joint sales agencies, joint research,
and the like, from collateral agreements to, for example, fix prices which would be a per se
violation. L. SULLIVAN, § 77, supra note 5, at 207.
48 83 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Ohio 1949), modifed and afd, 341 U.S. 593 (1951). Cf United
States v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 118 F. Supp. 41 (D. Del. 1953), afd, 351 U.S. 377
(1956) (ancillary restraints arising from territorial limitations in license reasonable since partici-
pants not competitors). The doctrine of ancillarity originated in United States v. Addyston
Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), modifiedandaJ'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
49 83 F. Supp. at 312. See Sanib Corp. v. United Fruit Co., 135 F. Supp. 764 (S.D.N.Y.
1955) (conspiracy between parent and subsidiary to monopolize portion of trade between Hon-
duras and United States). Cf Industria Siciliana Asfalti v. Exxon Research & Engineering,
[1977-1] Trade Cases (CCH) 61,256 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (dismiss tie-in claim but find jurisdiction
over parent through effects in restraint of design and engineering services). For elaboration on
the tie-in, see Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969) (requir-
ing showing that market power in tying product affects competition in tied products, plus ele-
ment of coercion). See generall W. FUGATE, § 10, supra note 2, at 319.
5O 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1949); 115 F. Supp. 835 (1953) (judgment implementing opin-
ion). Compare Kintner & Griffin, supra note 14, at 291 with Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine
Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951) (no jurisdiction since only peripheral effects in U.S.).
5I 344 U.S. 280 (1952).
52 Id. at 281-89. The Lanham Trade-Mark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127, bestows
jurisdiction on federal courts to award relief against trademark infringement perpetrated
against a U.S. corporation in a foreign country by a citizen and resident of the United States
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both the Sherman Act and the Wilson Tariff Act were invoked against
an agreement made in Switzerland, involving some U.S. producers,
designed to protect an important industry and sanctioned by local
(Swiss) law. While the case is most noted for its treatment of the foreign
government compulsion question, 54 it is illustrative of the expansive
reach of the antitrust statutes generally. Though the activity was sanc-
tioned by Swiss law, it was not protected by that law; it was, accordingly,
open to antitrust attack.
Monopoly, such as that found in Alcoa,5 5 is the primary offensive
conduct of antitrust. More often than not, however, monopolistic con-
duct involves other than simply monopoly or the attempt to attain it.
For example, conduct may be characterized as constituting a cartel
agreement, a market allocation, a predatory practice, or one of the tradi-
tional per se violations such as price fixing or tie-in.5 6
One of the more frequently litigated areas is that concerning the
legalized monopoly of the patent and the attempt to employ it to obtain
greater benefits than intended by the original grant. 57 In the leading
case, United States v. Singer Manufacturing Co. ,58 an arrangement involving
the use of patent pools and cross-licenses with European manufacturers
was struck down. While no questions of patent validity were in issue, the
court found that the various agreements together constituted an "over-
riding common design to exclude Japanese machines in the United
whose products, or parts of them, originate in this country and reflect adversely on the Ameri-
can corporation's trade reputation. See generaly Whitney, Sources of Con ftct Between International
Law and the Antitrust Laws, 63 YALE L.J. 655 (1954).
53 [1963] Trade Cases (CCH) 70,600 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). See generally Kintner & Griffin,
supra note 14, at 236.
54 See text accompanying note 103 in ra.
55 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 422 (2d Cir. 1945). Basic
antitrust monopoly theory is set forth in United Stats v. Grinnell, 384 U.S. 563 (1966) (posses-
sion plus intent). For a recent analysis in the international antitrust context, see International
Ry. of Central America v. United Brands Co., 532 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
835 (1976) (even with monopoly must show intent and injury). But see United States v. De
Beers Consolidated Mines, Ltd., 325 U.S. 212 (1945). See generaly W. FUGATE, § 6.1 et seq., supra
note 2, at 201.
56 See, e.g., note 46 supra and accompanying text. It should also be noted that a monopo-
list will be held to a higher standard of conduct in that any activity by it will have a naturally
greater impact on the market. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 427
(2d Cir. 1945); United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass.
1953), aj'd, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
57 See, e.g., Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery and Chemical Corp., 382
U.S. 172 (1965) (enforcement of fraudulently procurred patent may violate Sherman Act § 2).
See generally W. BOWMAN, PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAW (1973); Note, A Survty of the Patent-
Antitrust Controverg in International Trade, 52 NOTRE DAME LAW. 957 (1977). Compare Zenith
Radio Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969) (antitrust counterclaim in infringe-
ment action; illegal to join patent pool which has effect of banning exports), with Dunlop Co. v.
Kelsey-Hayes Co., 484 F.2d 407 (6th Cir. 1973) (territorial licenses are not necessarily a horizon-
tal market allocation). For a comprehensive recent discussion of the patent area of antitrust
generally,4see SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 463 F. Supp. 983 (D. Conn. 1978).
58 374 U.S. 174 (1963). See W. FUGATE § 8.2, supra note 2, at 290. See also United States v.
Timken Roller Bearing Co., supra note 48 (aggregation of restraints causing cumulative effect on
competition).
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States" and thereby stifle competition. 59
II.
In light of the broad extraterritorial reach of the antitrust statutes,
some mention should be made of the few relatively narrow areas of ex-
emption. It must be emphasized that, like all antitrust exemptions, these
will be construed so as to allow only a highly limited application. 60 In
general, the exemptions are found in specialized regulated industries
such as ocean shipping, governed by the Shipping Act of 1916,61 or air
transport, governed by the Federal Aviation Act and various interna-
tional agreements. 6 2 The latter, of course, is currently undergoing an
overhaul and dismantling specifically designed to increase competition
within the industry.63
The Shipping Act is administered by the Federal Maritime Com-
mission, which is charged with passing on rate agreements filed with it.
In United States v. Far East Conference,64 it was held that the Commission
has primary jurisdiction over dual-rate agreements which are properly
filed. On the other hand, any fixing of rates outside of specific Commis-
sion approval has been held to raise antitrust claims.6 5 In addition,
mergers of carriers have been found ineligible for approval and outside
the scope of the statutory exemption. 66 Moreover, the primary jurisdic-
59 374 U.S. at 19,5. See also United States v. National Lead Co., supra note 46. One of the
factors in National Lead was the agreement to prohibit the export of licensed products into an-
other company's territory which the court interpreted as an attempt to divide markets and
overreach lawful patent rights. An interesting question is whether the arrangement would have
passed muster without such an express prohibition since export of a validly patented and/or
trademarked item might cause an infringement abroad. At any rate, the evidence of the express
agreement served to show the requisite anti-competitive intent. For discussion of proof of in-
tent, see United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526 (1973) (circumstantial evidence is
the lifeblood of antitrust). See also Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Industries, Inc., [1979-
2] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) $ 62,790 (3d Cir. 1979) (licensees' allegation that patent owner
cancelled at insistence of foreign licensees states a Sherman Act claim).
60 It is settled doctrine that "exemptions from antitrust coverage are strictly construed."
Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 733 (1973). See also United
States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321,350 (1963), where the court stated: "[r]epeals of
the antitrust laws by implication from a regulatory statute are strongly disfavored, and have
only been found in cases of plain repugnancy between the antitrust and regulatory provisions."
But see Pan Am. World Airways v. United States, 371 U.S. 296 (1963) (preemption of antitrust
by primary agency jurisdiction).
61 Shipping Act of 1916, 46 U.S.C. §§ 801-42 (1976). See E. KINTNER & M. JOELSON,
supra note 2, at 169; W. FUGATE, supra note 2, § 6.3, at 212, § 13.9, at 402.
62 Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1976). See E. KINTNER & M. JOELSON,
supra note 2, at 183; W. FUGATE, supra note 2, § 6.3, at 213, § 13.10, at 404.
63 See Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301 et seq, §§ 1551 et seq. (termina-
tion of Civil Aeronautics Board and transfers of certain functions).
64 94 F. Supp. 900 (D.N.J. 1951), rev'd, 342 U.S. 570 (1952). But see Federal Maritime Bd.
v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S. 481 (1958) (FMB cannot approve dual rate contracts designed to
hamper competition). See also Bonner Act, 46 U.S.C. § 813a (1976).
65 Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American President Lines, Ltd., 285 F. Supp. 949 (S.D.N.Y.
1968) (no rate fixing outside FMC approval).
66 Seatrain Lines, Inc. v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 460 F.2d 932 (D.C. Cir. 1972), afd,
411 U.S. 726 (1973).
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tion of the Federal Maritime Commission now results only in a stay,
rather than a dismissal, of any concurrent antitrust proceedings. 67 While
valuable, and perhaps necessary, this exemption is becoming progres-
sively more circumscribed. 68
The most prominent and controversial exemption from application
of antitrust to foreign commerce is found in the Webb-Pomerene Export
Trade Act of 1918.69 The Act was the result of a Federal Trade Commis-
sion study which concluded that U.S. exporters were disadvantaged by
the existence of foreign cartels as well as hampered by the threat of anti-
trust prosecution if they attempted to organize effectively to trade
abroad. 70 The Webb Act allows agreement between exporters so long as
such agreements are not in restraint of trade within the United States, do
not operate so as to restrain competing domestic exporters, and do not
affect domestic prices. 71
There has been remarkably little significant litigation over the
Webb-Pomerene Act. It was not until United States Alkali Export Associa-
lion, Inc. v. United States72 in 1945 that the Supreme Court determined
.,that the Department of Justice could institute antitrust proceedings for
violation of the Act without first obtaining a recommendation from the
FTC. On remand, the trial court found that agreements between domes-
tic exporters and their foreign competitors, allocating territories, fixing
prices, and setting quotas violated the Sherman Act and lay outside the
terms of the Webb Act exemption. 73
In United States v. Ainnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co. ,'74 a district
court outlined what it saw as the range of permitted activities under the
Act. Examining the agreement before it, the court found that the Webb
exemption allowed agreements to export only through the association, to
purchase only from members, to refuse to deal with non-members, to fix
prices charged by foreign distributors, to limit withdrawal from the asso-
ciation, and to require distributors not to handle similar products of
competitors. 75 The court, however, ruled that the defendants had ex-
67 Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound Conf., 383 U.S. 213 (1966), modifwd, 383 U.S. 932
(1966).
68 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE TASK GROUP ON ANTITRUST IMMUNITIES
(1977). The Report concludes that "regulation has served to promote the increasing carteliza-
tion of the ocean shipping industry," and that freight rates are an estimated 45% higher due to
the conference system. Id. at 62.
69 Webb-Pomerene Export Trade Act of 1918, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-66 (1979). See generally E.
KINTNER & M. JOELSON, supra note 2, at 177; W. FUGATE, supra note 2, § 7.1, at 223.
70 See Federal Trade Comm'n, Report on Cooperation in American Export Trade (1916);
FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, WEBB-POMERENE ASSOcIATIONS: A 50-YEAR REVIEW (1967) [here-
inafter cited as 1967 REvIEW]. See also Note, The Webb-Pomerene Act. A Reexamination of Export
Cartels in World Trade, 19 VA. J. INT'L L. 151 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Webb Note]. See cases
cited at note 26 supra.
71 15 U.S.C. § 62 (1976).
72 325 U.S. 196 (1945).
73 United States v. United States Alkali Export Ass'n, 86 F. Supp. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
74 92 F. Supp. 947 (D. Mass. 1950).
75 Id. at 964-65.
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ceeded these bounds in their agreement concerning coated abrasives by
reducing exports in favor of foreign facilities and by price discrimination
against competing domestic exporters. The decree ordered the parties to
reform the agreement in accordance with these findings rather than dis-
solve it. 76 More recently, in United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export
Associaton, Inc. ,77 the Supreme Court further constricted the Webb Act
in ruling that sales by an export association, effectuated wholly through
the Agency for International Development, were not "export trade" even
though the commodities were ultimately delivered abroad; consequently,
the sales were not protected by the provisions of the Act. 7
8
The Webb-Pomerene Act has been highly controversial and much
criticized. Even the Federal Trade Commission admits that the Act has
not lived up to the original expectations. 79 Recent data for 1978 indicate
that there are now only thirty registered associations, with no more than
twenty-seven of these currently active.80 Exports assisted by Webb as-
sociations, as of 1976, amounted to approximately $1.725 billion out of a
total of $114 billion; this is about one-third less than in 1962.81 It is also
significant that, despite the original intent to aid small businesses enter-
ing export trade, Webb members today generally consist of relatively
large firms.82
Despite these facts, the Webb Act has survived repeated calls for its
repeal or reform.8 3 Because of continuing concern over the trade deficit
and a rising concern over foreign state trading companies, it is likely the
Webb Act will remain essentially intact despite its shortcomings.8 4
Within the limits described, it remains a viable approach to participation
in the export trade.
III.
As the foregoing points out, the extraterritorial application of the
U.S. antitrust laws has been extensive. Extraterritoriality logically de-
rives from the preferred position of antitrust as a basic national policy
76 Id. at 966.
77 393 U.S. 199 (1968).
78 Id. at 209.
79 See 1967 REVIEW, supra note 70, at 23.
80 See FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, WEBB-POMERENE: TEN YEARS LATER (Nov. 1978), at
6. The author wishes to thank Richard M. Duke of the F.T.C. Bureau of Economics for supply-
ing a copy of this report.
81 Id. at 15. See 1967 REVIEW, supra note 70, at 23.
82 See Webb Note, supra note 70, at 158, Table I.
83 See E. KINTNER & M. JOELSON, supra note 2, at 182; W. FUGATE, supra note 2, § 7.15, at
248.
84 See Webb Note, supra note 70, at 181. See also Report to the President and the Attorney
General, NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND PROCEDURES
(1979); United States Export Policy, Statement by the President (Sept. 26, 1978), reprinted in
WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 1631 (1978). For discussion of the general problem of cartels
and state trading companies, see Joelson & Griffin, The Legal Status of Nation-State Cartels Under
United States Antitrust and Pub/i& International Law, 9 INT'L LAW. 617 (1975).
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and from the assertion of a right to reach activities abroad which are
intended to affect commerce here and actually do impact on it.8 5 The
central question, then, becomes one of jurisdiction as U.S. antitrust law
increasingly conflicts with foreign laws, foreign sovereigns, and differing
policies . 6 It is to this area we now turn to examine what may well be the
outer limits of antitrust extraterritoriality.
The doctrine of sovereign immunity has been recognized in the
courts of the United States since the earliest days of the Republic.8 7 The
doctrine is founded upon notions of comity, of the equality of sovereign
states, and of the separation of powers which lodges the conduct of for-
eign relations with the Executive Branch."" While it is a corollary to the
territorial principle and is fashioned to prevent interference with a for-
eign sovereign within its own territory, international law would generally
deny immunity for activity which crosses national borders and has an
effect in the forum state.8 9
Numerous exceptions have been grafted onto the practical applica-
tion of sovereign immunity. Perhaps the most significant has been the
reliance by the courts on determinations of immunity by the Executive.
In Beritzzi Bros. v. SS Pesaro,9° for example, the Supreme Court based its
resolution of the issue on the Executive's suggestion of immunity and
consideration of the purpose, rather than the nature, of the conduct.9 '
At the same time, however, courts have recognized a major exception to
immunity where there is a valid waiver, express or implied, particularly
where foreign sovereigns utilize United States courts for the litigation of
claims.9
2
Most pertinent to this discussion has been the exception distinguish-
ing a sovereign's public acts,Jure imperii, from non-immune, purely com-
mercial acts, Jure geslt'ont's.9 3 This distinction raises the difficult question
of characterization, of determining what are truly commercial activi-
85 See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
86 R. VERNON, STORM OVER THE MULTINATIONALS (1977); Joelson & Griffin, supra note
84.
87 See Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). See also W. Fu-
GATE, supra note 2, § 3.10, at 111 e seq.; RESTATEMENT, supra note 33, § 65.
88 See generally, Timberg, Sovereign Immunty and Act of State Defenses: Transnational Boycotts and
Economic Coercion, 55 TEx. L. REV. 1 (1976); Note, Sovereign Immunity, 18 HARV. INT'L L.J. 429
(1977).
89 See The S.S. Lotus, [1927] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10. See also Haight, supra note 32;
Whitney, supra note 52.
90 271 U.S. 562 (1926). See Ex Parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943) (immunity granted on
suggestion); Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945) (no position by State Depart-
ment) (immunity denied). For a critical discussion, see Jessup, Has the Supreme Court Abdicated One
of Its Functions.,, 40 AM. J. INT'L L. 168 (1946).
91 271 U.S. at 574.
92 See National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356 (1955) (sovereign exposed to
counterclaim, in amount of its claim, when it avails itself of U.S. courts); Ipitrade Int'l, S.A. v.
Federal Republic of Nigeria, 465 F. Supp. 824 (D.D.C. 1978) (waiver of immunity in agreement
to arbitrate contract disputes).
93 For example, see Bank of United States v. Planters Bank of Georgia, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
904 (1824), at 907, where Chief Justice Marshall stated, "[Wlhen a government becomes a part-
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ties.94 Although in 1952 the State Department officially adopted the re-
strictive theory, denying immunity for commercial conduct, the
confusion in the case law has continued and has been heightened by the
Department's ongoing interference.9 5
The affirmative defense of sovereign immunity has been further
clouded by a conflict of laws principle, the act of state doctrine, which
requires a court to recognize and give effect to foreign law even though it
may be contrary to that of the forum. 96 Like sovereign immunity, act of
state is substantially grounded in judicial deference to the Executive in
foreign affairs matters. In Banco Nactonal de Cuba v. Sabbatno,97 the
Supreme Court refused to inquire into the validity of Cuban expropria-
tion decrees but, significantly, limited its holding to the expropriation
situation and its rationale to Executive prerogative.
In First National Ciy Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba,98 a divided court
allowed a counterclaim and set-off on the basis of the Executive's expres-
sion of non-interest. Subsequently, in A/fred Dunhili of London, Inc. v. Re-
pubh'c of Cuba,99 a majority found no act of state preventing Cuban
interventors from returning monies mistakenly paid in settlement of im-
ner in any trading company, it divests itself, so far as concerns the transactions of that company,
of its sovereign character, and takes that of a private citizen."
94 Compare In re Investigation of World Arrangements, 13 F.R.D. 280 (D.D.C. 1952) (im-
munity granted Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. since partly owned by British government to supply fuel
to Royal Navy) with United States v. Deutsches Kalisyndikat Gesellschaft, 31 F.2d 199
(S.D.N.Y. 1929) (immunity denied French government-owned cartel member mining potash in
France). See Lauterpacht, The Problem ofJur dWtional Immunties of Foreign States, 28 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 220 (1951).
95 Letter of Jack B. Tate, reprinted in 26 DEP'T OF STATE BULL. 984 (1952). See Bishop,
New United States Policy Limiting Sovereign Immunity, 47 AM. J. INT'L L. 93 (1953). In Victory
Transport v. Comisaria General, 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965),
only a limited category of conduct was found to bejiure inperil: See also Rich v. Naviera Vacuba,
S.A., 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961) (suggestion of immunity traded for return of hijacked airliner);
Isbrandtsen Tankers, Inc. v. President of India, 446 F.2d 1198 (2d Cir. 1971) (contract to trans-
port grain; dismissed on suggestion, despite apparent waiver). Compare Aerotrade v. Republic of
Haiti, 376 F. Supp. 1281 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) with Pan American Tankers Corp. v. Republic of
Vietnam, 296 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). For a summary of State Department immunity
opinions, see DEP'T OF STATE, DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW,
1017 app. (1977).
96 See Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897), at 252, where the Supreme Court
stated: "Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign
State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of another within its
own territory." The RESTATEMENT, supra note 33, § 41, adopts the principle but, in Comment
a, points out that it is not generally recognized in international law. See Delson, The Act of State
Doctrine-Judictal Deference or Abstention, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 82 (1972). See also Kintner & Griffin,
supra note 14, at 230.
97 376 U.S. 398 (1964). Congress promptly responded with passage of the Hickenlooper
Amendment directing federal courts to consider the merits of expropriation claims. See Hick-
enlooper Amendment, Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2). See also Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1967).
98 406 U.S. 759 (1972). See Lowenfeld, Act ofState and Department of State. First National City
Bank v. Banco Nacionalde Cuba, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 795 (1972); Note, Executive Suggestion andAct of
State Cases.- Implications of the Stevenson Letter in the Citibank Case, 12 HARV. INT'L L.J. 557 (1971).
99 425 U.S. 682 (1976). For a review and synopsis of the issues, see Summa~r and Excerptsfiom
the Briefts, 15 INT'L LEG. MAT. 146 (1976).
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port accounts. Section III of the decision, supported by a plurality of the
Justices, goes further in holding, "[i]t is fair to say that the 'restrictive
theory' of sovereign immunity appears to be generally accepted as the
prevailing law in this country . . . [w]e decline to extend the act of state
doctrine to acts committed by foreign sovereigns in the course of their
purely commercial dealing."' 1
In American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co. ,l0t the alternative holding
was based upon act of state and the court's hesitancy to inquire into the
acts of a foreign sovereign taking place within its own territory. United
States v. Sisal Sales Corp. ,102 of course, distinguished this holding by sepa-
rating out the private antitrust conspiracy from the merely collateral acts
of the Mexican government. Subsequent cases have expanded on this
approach by attempting to separate private from governmental activity
and distinguishing the merely passive or privately induced participation
of a foreign sovereign from clear compulsion.' 0 3 The courts, however,
remain inhibited by their perhaps excessive sensitivity to foreign relations
matters.
Act of state, in the form of foreign sovereign compulsion, was upheld
as a valid defense to an antitrust claim in Interamerican Refintg Corp. v.
Texaco Maracaibo, Inc. 104 wherein the court found that crude oil deliveries
were clearly blocked by the direct intervention of the Venezuelan gov-
ernment: "Anticompetitive practices compelled by foreign nations are
not restraints of commerce, as commerce is understood in the Sherman
Act, because refusal to comply would put an end to commerce."' 10 5
In the complex Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co. 106
litigation, plaintiff alleged an antitrust conspiracy in which defendant
instigated a border dispute ultimately resulting in Occidental's loss of its
oil concessions. The court, relying on act of state, felt constrained to dis-
miss the action since any inquiry would necessitate examination of issues
of ownership in the disputed territory, questions, it held, more properly
addressed by the Executive as involving recognition of states. 0 7
100 425 U.S. at 704. Compare Leigh & Sandier, Dunhill: TowardA Reconsideration of Sabbatino,
16 VA. J. INT'L L. 685 (1976) with Rabinowitz, Viva Sabbatino, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 697 (1977).
101 213 U.S. 347 (1909). Again, the case has been narrowed, but never specifically over-
ruled. See Whitney, supra note 52, at 657 n.5; Jennings, supra note 14, at 161; ANTITRUST DE-
VELOPMENTS, supra note 14, at 365.
102 274 U.S. 268 (1927). In Sisal, the defendants had obtained favorable legislation from
Mexico in furtherance of their monopolization scheme.
103 See, e.g., Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962);
United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc., [1963] Trade Cases
(CCH) 70,600 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). See generall Kintner & Hollgarten, supra note 24.
104 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970). The case is unique and has been the subject of
considerable criticism. See, e.g., ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 23. But see United States v.
Bechtel Corp., [1979-1] Trade Cases (CCH) $ 62,429 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
105 307 F. Supp. at 1298.
106 331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Cal. 1971), a~d, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 950 (1972).
107 See Note, Act of State Doctrine-Antitrust Law.. Occidental Petroleum v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 3
DEN. J. INT'L L. & PoL. 133 (1973). See also Occidental of Um Al Qawayn, Inc. v. A Certain
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It must be emphasized that Occidental was decided specifically on act
of state grounds. Although raised as a defense, the court did not defini-
tively address the controversial question of application of the Parker or
Noerr-Pennington doctrines to the international setting. 10 8 While a full ex-
amination of this issue is beyond the scope of this discussion, it would
appear that, even if applied with relation to foreign governments, these
parallel domestic-law doctrines have been so substantially eroded in re-
cent years as to render the impact of their international application rela-
tively insignificant.' 0 9
In Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp. ,110 the Second Circuit, while it followed
DunhtlI, refused to inquire into an alleged conspiracy to induce Libya to
nationalize plaintiff's oil concessions. Like Occidental, the Hunt court,
rather than focus on the alleged private conspiracy, hesitated to inquire
into the process of nationalization which, as Sabbatino held, involves pecu-
liarly local, sovereign considerations not subject to judicial review.I' A
strong dissent, relying on the commercial exception themes of Dunhill,
criticized application of act of state as a mere "screen [from] accountabil-
ity" for essentially private anticompetitive conduct. 112
While the case law is certainly far from settled, a common thread
emerges from the attempt to find the lines between conduct purely sover-
eign in nature and conduct which has no true basis in sovereignty." 3
Cargo of Petroleum Laden Aboard the Tanker Dauntless Calocotronis, 557 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir.
1978) (ownership of lifted oil raises political questions of sovereignty and recognition).
108 A similar defense was raised unsuccessfully in Continental Ore Co. V. Union Carbide & Carbon
Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962), at 707. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943) (domestic state
action as immunizing anticompetitive conduct); Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor
Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961) (right to petition for favorable legislation). See generally Fis-
chel, Antitrust Liabil for Attempts to Influence Government Actions: The Basis and Limits of the Noerr-
Pennington Doctrine, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 80 (1977); Kintner & Kaufman, The State Action Immunity
Defense, 23 AM. U.L. REV. 527 (1974); Comment, Corporate Lobbyists Abroad- The Extraterrtorial
Application of Noerr-Pnningto Antitrust Immunity, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 1254 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as Noerr Comment]. See also Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, [1979-2] Trade Cases (CCH)
62,792 (D. Del. 1979) (fraudulent filing with agency may state antitrust claim; but filing suit
against defendant unable to meet money judgment not within sham exception).
109 See Note, Parker v. Brown Revisited" The State Action Doctrine Afler Goldfarb, Cantor and Bates,
77 COLUM. L. REV. 898 (1977) (domestic state action may now be preempted by antitrust laws).
Compare Noerr Comment, supra note 108 and Fischel, supra note 108 (opposing application of the
doctrines to foreign governments) with Baker, Antitrust Remedies Against Govemment-Inspired Boy-
cots, Shortages, and Squeezes.- Wandering on the Road to Mecca, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 911 (1976) and
Meal, Defenses to the Extraterritorial Reach of Antitrust Law. A Choice of Law Approach, 3 FLETCHER
FORUM 47 (1978).
1l1 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1977), aJ'd, 410 F. Supp. 10 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
111 550 F.2d at 76. See Recent Decision, Act ofState, 17 VA.J. INT'L L. 311 (1977).
112 550 F.2d at 81. But see Carey v. National Oil Corp., 453 F. Supp. 1097 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)
(cut-off of crude oil deliveries determined to be part of a foreign policy initiative and expropria-
tion program and hence not reviewable).
113 See Bokkelen v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 432 F. Supp. 329 (E.D.N.Y. 1977). The
court dismissed an antitrust claim based on the defendant's obtaining cancellation of import
licenses by Brazilian authorities, stating: "[dienial of import licenses is not the type of activity
that a business is capable of and is the type of activity normally considered within a govern-
ment's power. Therefore, even if there is an exception to the act of state doctrine [under Dun-
hil], it does not apply here." 432 F. Supp. at 334. See a/so Mannington Mills, Inc. v.
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Outlining what may well become a major vehicle for resolution of these
questions, the Ninth Circuit, in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America,
NT & SA., 'l4 adopted what it called the "jurisdictional rule of rea-
son."'"15 Noting that Sabbatino had not found the act of state doctrine to
be constitutionally compelled, the court refused to find that the rule con-
fers a blank-check immunity upon all conduct blessed with some impri-
matur of a foreign government." '"16
Distinguishing earlier cases and separating out the private conspira-
torial activities from the sovereign conduct set up as a defense (court
proceedings in Honduras), Judge Choy attempted to refine the Alcoa and
Restatement effects test by adopting a three-part procedure requiring: 1)
proof of some effect; 2) proof the effect is large enough to injure the
plaintiff; and, 3) proof that the magnitude of the effect is such that, con-
sidering other nations, the assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction isjusti-
fied." I7 In sum, the court's rule of reason, " . . . [does] not in any way
question the 'validity' of 'foreign law or policy' . . . [The] legitimacy of
each nation's interests is assumed. It is merely the relative involvement
of each state . . .that is to be evaluated.""18
Application of such a rule can go a long way toward preserving a
plaintiff's access to the courts, allowing for enforcement of antitrust poli-
cies and, at the same time, mitigating, even if not eliminating, the head-
on clashes with foreign sovereigns which have so often arisen in interna-
tional antitrust cases. " '9 For example, the recent consent decree in United
Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding that the mere issuance of patents is not
an act of state). The defense must show that "the foreign decree was basic and fundamental to
the alleged antitrust behavior and more than merely peripheral to the overall course of con-
duct." Id. at 1293.
114 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976). For the genesis of the jurisdictional rule of reason, see K.
BREWSTER, supra note 2, at 446.
115 549 F.2d at 613.
116 Id. at 606. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 421 (1964). But see
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962): "[I]t is error to suppose that every case or controversy
which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance."
117 549 F.2d at 613. See Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1294
(3d Cir. 1979). The court observed: "The grant of patents for floor coverings is not the type of
sovereign activity that would be of substantial concern to the executive branch in its conduct of
international affairs."
118 549 F.2d at 615 n.34. See generally Recent Decisions, Antitrust-Act of State-Extraterrito-
ral/Jurisdiction, 18 VA. J. INT'L L. 321 (1978); Note, The InternationalReach of United States Antitrust
Law and the Stgnifxance of Tinberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 13 U. RIcH. L. REv. 149
(1978); Address by John H. Shenefield, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, reprinted
in 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 50,386.
119 See, e.g., United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc., [1963]
Trade Cases (CCH) 70,600 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), order modiftd, [1965] Trade Cases (CCH) 71,352
(S.D.N.Y. 1965); Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A.
v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958), infa note 121. For a recent treatment of the overall problem, see
generally Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1294-1303 (3d Cir. 1979).
The latter specifically adopts the Timberlane approach in its analysis. In a concurring opinion,
Judge Adams raises an important question regarding the issues of comity and abstention in
cases where application of the antitrust laws would require clearly inconsistent behavior under
foreign law, stating that, "[t]o my knowledge no abstention doctrine exists with respect to con-
18 N.CJ. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
States v. Bechtel Corp. 120 is framed so as to recognize the essential validity
of the Arab countries' boycott legislation directed against Israel, allow
U.S. contractors to continue to operate in the Middle East, and carry out
the objectives of both U.S. antitrust and anti-boycott legislation by con-
fining, as far as possible, the effects of the boycott.
Even with the imberlane rule of reason, the constantly expanding
reach of U.S. antitrust will make for continuing international contro-
versy and continued lack of a real consistency in the cases. Discovery, for
example, has recently resurfaced as an issue. Like other aspects of anti-
trust litigation, United States rules regarding the discovery and produc-
tion of documents as well as the deposition of parties and witnesses are
particularly broad and, in international practice, often conflict with
more limited foreign rules and nondisclosure laws.' 2 1 For example, sub-
poenae in the government's investigation of the shipping industry were
met with protests from eleven nations and the passage of criminal laws
preventing compliance in Britain. 122 In the massive In re Westinghouse
Electric Corporation Uranium Contract 123 litigation, currently underway, the
attempt to obtain evidence abroad has rather consistently met with ei-
ther unfavorable legislation or court decisions.
More uncertainty is promised as various aspects of the 1976 Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) are tested in court. 124 While the Act is
an attempt to settle some of the confusion in the cases by legislating the
commercial activities exception postulated in the Dunhill plurality opin-
ion, it also potentially extends that exception further than any court has
previously dared to go. 125 Significantly, the legislative history accompa-
siderations of international comity. Rather, as Timber/ane and Pacifc Seafarers demonstrate, such
considerations have been incorporated into an expanded jurisdictional test." Id. at 1302 n.9.
120 [1979-1] Trade Cases (CCH) 62,429 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (consent decree). See Jones,
Extraterrdoria/ity in US Antitrust: An International "Hot Potato," II INT'L LAW. 415 (1977); Recent
Development, Antitrust as an Antidote to the Arab Boycott, 8 L. & POL. INT'L Bus. 799 (1976).
121 Discovery has long been a source of especially heated controversy. See, e.g., Interhandel
Case (Switzerland v. United States), [19591 I.C.J. 6, where the Swiss government appealed to
the World Court before reaching a final compromise; Societe Internationale Pour Participations
Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958) (applying test of good faith
compliance). Cf United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1968) (applying
balancing of interests test). The latter test has been adopted by the RESTATEMENT, supra note
33, § 40. See generally Note, Foreign Nondsclosure Laws and Domestic Discoveqy Orders in Antitrust
Litigation, 88 YALE L.J. 612 (1979).
122 See In re Grand Jury Investigation of the Shipping Industry, 186 F. Supp. 298 (D.D.C.
1960). See also In re Canadian Int'l Paper Co., 72 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1947), in which the
U.S. subpoena was finally withdrawn after protests by the Canadian government, which subse-
quently passed nondisclosure statutes.
123 436 F. Supp. 990 (J.P.M.D.L. 1977). For background and discussion, see Comment, The
International Uranium Cartel- Litigation and Legal Implications, 14 TEx. INT'L L.J 59 (1979); Mer-
hige, The Westinghouse Uranium Case.- Problems Encountered in Seeking Foreign Discovey and Evidence,
13 INT'L LAW. 19 (1979).
124 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-11. For the legislative
history, see[1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & Ad. News 6604-35 [hereinafter cited as Legislative His-
tory]. See generally articles cited in note 88 supra; Brower, Bistline & Loomis, The Foreign Sovereign
Immunittis Act of 1976 in Practice, 73 AM. J. INT'L L. 200 (1979).
125 The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act specifically denies sovereign immunity for the
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nying the FSIA indicates both that it is meant to apply in antitrust cases
and that it is framed so as to avoid any substitution of the act of state
defense for that of sovereign immunity.' 2 6 Moreover, it should also be
noted that the Act was initiated, drafted and fully supported by the Ex-
ecutive Branch and, in particular, by the Department of State. 27 This
alone should impress any court hesitant to interfere in an area of foreign
affairs traditionally considered beyond judicial review. 12 3
Conclusions
With the extraterritorial reach and grasp of United States antitrust
constantly expanding and with antitrust litigation constantly increasing,
the exercise of vigilance and care is essential in each and every interna-
tional business transaction. While this discussion has only scratched the
surface of the law, it should be obvious that hardly any activity is pro-
tected from antitrust scrutiny and challenge. Defensive antitrust, in the
form of review and compliance programs, and use of local counsel are
extremely important to both lawyer and businessmen. More than ever,
creative lawyering will be needed as antitrust jurisdiction expands with
the trade it polices and continues to clash with differing systems and val-
ues abroad. At the same time, the expanding reach of extraterritoriality
offers added opportunities to employ antitrust to cure defects and redress
abuses of the open and competitive marketplace.
Question and Answer Period
Mr. Lacey: Before I go to the questions I would like to mention a
couple of points to tie together some of the areas that Mr. Davidow and I
discussed. In the Mannington Mt'ls' case an interesting distinction was
commercial activities of a foreign state, its agents or instrumentalities, in any case based upon
"[aln act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of
the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1605(a)(2). The Act provides that the characterization of conduct is to be based upon the
nature, not the purpose, of the conduct. Id. at § 1603(d). In transferring responsibility for these
determinations from the Executive to the courts, the Act intends that the latter will have wide
latitude in characterizing the activity. See Legislative History, supra note 124, at 6615. Compare
cases cited in note 90 with cases cited in note 95 supra.
126 See Legislative History, supra note 124, at 6618, 6619 and n.l. Compare Carey v. Na-
tional Oil Corp., 453 F. Supp. 1097 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) with Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel,
461 F. Supp. 384 (D. Del. 1978) (jurisdiction over foreign state trading company; FSIA extends
to antitrust suits and is not limited to "ordinary torts"). See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (noncom-
mercial torts under the FSIA); seegeneral4' Timberg, supra note 88.
127 See Statement of President Ford (Oct. 22, 1976), reprinted in 75 DEP'T STATE BULL. 648
(1976). See generally Timberg, supra note 88; Note, supra note 88.
128 As of this writing the Act is being tested in a private antitrust action against the Organi-
zation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). See International Ass'n of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers v. Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Civil No. 78-
5012-AAH (SX) (C.D. Cal.). On August 24, 1979, the court dismissed the claim against OPEC
for lack of service and the claims against the individual sovereigns on the ground of their immu-
nity from suit. The plaintiffs have stated that they intend to appeal.
I Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Industries, Inc. [1979-2] Trade Cases 62,790
(3d Cir. 1979).
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made. The case involved the issuing of kitchen floor covering patents,
and the court held that issuing patents for kitchen floor coverings is not
the sort of activity that deeply affects U.S. foreign policy considerations.
Ordinarily in cases involving a conflict with a foreign sovereign or for-
eign law the old doctrines of comity and abstention come into play. The
Court's discussion in Manningon Mis is thus very important in this re-
gard, and I recommend it to you on this point. The concurring opinion
particularly uses the Hunt-Dunhi/l line of cases and talks about the pos-
sibility that comity and abstention have in effect been merged into an
expanded jurisdictional test under the T'nberlane theory.
Question: Can an antitrust issue arise when only one company en-
gages in a form of business in which no other company competes, en-
gages, or shows any desire? For example, a highly specialized limited
market situation?
Mr. Lacey: The "Cellophane Case' 2 comes to mind. That case in-
volved a French patent for cellophane in the early 1950s, when it was still
a fledgling industry in this country. An exclusive license had been
granted to DuPont, and the Court ruled that DuPont could have the
exclusive license. This form of license is in fact an allocation of territo-
ries, but the Court allowed it. The answer to your question then is that
an antitrust issue could arise in that situation, but the courts may find
grounds to disregard it.
Question: Did the state of Connecticut participate in the OPEC case?
Was it asked to submit a brief?
Mr. Lacey: Judge Hauk issued an order to show cause in that case
(International Association of Mach it'ss v. OPEC).3 From my limited experi-
ence, I think that order was probably unique in antitrust law. He issued
a series of questions which he ordered to be distributed to anyone who
wanted to answer. He specially ordered that they be distributed to each
state governor, attorney general, secretary of state, etc.-to virtually
every state and federal agency that would have any interest in it-and
asked for comments. He asked anybody who had anything at all to say
about the issues to address them. The National Association of Attorneys
General put together a brief through the state of Washington addressed
specifically to the indirect purchaser problem, one of the very hot topics
in antitrust law right now because of the linois Brick4 case. Under lli-
nois Brick an indirect purchaser, for example, a consumer buying from a
retailer who has bought from the wholesaler who has bought from the
manufacturer, cannot sue for damages for a price fix at, for example, a
third removed level. The state of Connecticut filed one brief addressed
specifically to that issue and another, in addition to the National Associa-
2 United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
3 No. 78-5012-AAH(SX) (C.D. Cal.).
4 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
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tion brief, specifically addressed to the jurisdictional issue. I guess the
best thing to say is that the court was not terribly impressed.
Question: Could you comment a little further about substantiality as
part of the effect on U.S. trade? What degree is needed?
Mr. Lace: I think, as Mr. Davidow said, there is a series of tests:
foreseeability, substantiality, the degree of impact. More important to
keep in mind, though, is what would happen if this were strictly a domes-
tic situation. Think strictly in terms of this country, forget the interna-
tional borders, forget the fact that there is a foreign company involved
here, forget that there is foreign law involved. I think that is probably
one of the keys to finding antitrust injury, which is all a matter of proof
anyway. Today the rule of reason seems to be the by-word. The per se
activities are becoming less important, particularly after the GTE Sylva-
ma 5 case. You are looking for a factual analysis, you are looking for
economic proof and backing for your theory. The effect test is essentially
this: you have to have proof and look at it in terms of its strictly domestic
content.
Questzon: Why isn't the Webb-Pomerene Act utilized to a greater ex-
tent?
Mr. Lacey: I think that judging from the FTC reports that I have
seen and the commentary that I have read no one really knows why it's
not used. It's there to be used, and I think perhaps one of the reasons it is
not used is strictly a lack of familiarity and a lack of incentive to go
through the process of registering with the FTC.
Mr. Davidow: Product differentiation is also an important reason for
the Webb-Pomerene Act's lack of use. Americans generally do not want
to sell if they do not have labels. They want to make their own reputa-
tions.
Question: Did the court find intent in Alcoa or infer it from the facts
as inevitable?
Mr. Laceq: Yes. The Court found intent, as I recall, from the facts.
It inferred the intent, which is a traditional antitrust theory. The infer-
ence of intent is perfectly permissible.
Question: You mentioned sovereign immunity and gave two exam-
ples of buying shoes for the army or shoes for welfare. Is there a differ-
ence or does sovereign immunity cover both?
Mr. Lacey: That is the point of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act-trying to differentiate between the commercial activity and what
case law, particularly Vitog Transport,6 has developed. In distinguishing
what are the areas of non-sovereign interests, the cases go every which
way. In Rich v. Naverra-Vacuba7 the State Department traded off a sover-
5 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
6 Victory Transport v. Comissaria General, 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381
U.S. 934 (1965).
7 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961).
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eign immunity suggestion for the return of a hijacked airliner. In the
President of Indi'a8 case dealing with grain transport contracts, the State
Department's suggestion of immunity was granted, but in other cases in-
volving the transport of grain, there was no grant of immunity because
they involved strictly commercial contracts. The Foreign Sovereign Im-
munities Act is an attempt to take this determination out of the State
Department and give it to the courts. I think the cases are just starting to
develop, and it's hard to say which way they are going to go. But the
attempt is to let the court characterize the activity as either a commercial
or sovereign activity. You see that trend going through M4anninglon Mlls,
Dunhil, Bokkelen v. Grumman Aerospace Corp. 9 in which import licenses is-
sued by the government of Brazil were at issue. In that case the court
said that the granting of import licenses is not the sort of activity a busi-
ness can engage in. Governments do that, and therefore there is immu-
nity. The careful weighing of the facts is the most important thing.
8 Isbrandtsen Tankers, Inc. v. President of India, 446 F.2d 1198 (2d Cir. 1971).
9 432 F. Supp. 329 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
